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Abstract
Every place in the world experiences a level of crime within its borders, but there is much
contention as to which factors lead to crime. Economic conditions, due to their association with
poverty, are frequently discussed as a possible contributors to crime rates. This analysis
examines four macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and
interest rate) and their effect on crime rates (violent, property, and total). After thoroughly
reviewing the philosophical nature of crime, the current economic conditions through the lens of
the selected macroeconomic variables, and the present criminal landscape throughout the United
States and the rest of the world, this study focuses on the United States’ data from 1961 to 2019.
Regression analyses indicate that GDP per capita (change) was not a statistically significant
variable for any type of crime rate; additionally, unemployment rate was not a statistically
significant variable for violent crime. Overall, economic conditions, as defined by the selected
(and significant) variables, can explain 36% of the variance in violent crime rates, 63% of the
variance in property crime rates, and 60% of the variance in total crime rates. The data, in
conjunction with numerous corroborating sources, shows that changes in economic conditions
contribute to changes in crime rates. Additionally, the regressions suggest that property crimes
are more responsive to changes in economic conditions than violent crimes.
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I. Introduction
Crime has existed since civilization’s inception. No matter the method of deciding the
rules and guidelines which keep society contained, there have always been instances where
people have broken their social contracts. Once civilizations grew aware of these inefficiencies,
they began developing codes and laws in order to declare and immortalize the directives.
The Sumerian people, who settled in the area now known as Iraq, were likely the first
group to develop a written law code; additionally, the surviving tablets even indicate a separation
between civil and criminal disputes (Crime Museum, 2021). Still, the Sumerians were not the
only civilization in the region at this time. In fact, most of the adjacent civilizations to the
Sumerians documented their own laws in the same system of writing, cuneiform. The summation
of all these laws became known as cuneiform law (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2011). Because
these civilizations shared linguistic and cultural elements, there was noteworthy overlap between
the laws of each civilization. The critical point for the sake of this analysis, however, is the
simple recognition that all the involved civilizations, which existed in a cluster circa 2100 BCE,
developed these systems for the purpose of maintaining order under their individual domains, the
primary purpose of legal systems even to this day (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2011).
Social stability is an entry ticket for any thriving society; too many people violating the
rules uproots the entire system. In an ideal world, people would move about in coordinated
conjunction, adhering to the laws in place and progressing their civilization economically,
culturally, and politically. This remarkable notion of continued human progression, however, is
indeed a fantasy. Every single country in the world has a legal system and a number of violations
that occur within that legal system, represented through crime. In fact, a crime, in this analysis,
will serve as any action that violates a legal system under the relevant jurisdiction(s).
As noted, everywhere in the world experiences crimes every year, even though a few
countries do not have the infrastructure to report accurate information or simply do not release
crime statistics (World Population Review, 2022). As the data is investigated, clear patterns are
discernable. Venezuela, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Afghanistan, and Honduras hold the
highest five spots on the crime index list in 2021, and none of these countries have left the top six
spots since 2016, barring a gap Afghanistan’s data for 2016 (Numbeo, 2022). The same
phenomenon manifests itself at the other end of the spectrum, although admittedly to a lesser
degree. Countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Switzerland, South Korea, Hong Kong, Iceland, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates frequently finish at the bottom end of the crime index, meaning
they finish at the top of the safety index (Numbeo, 2022).
There are numerous factors that lead into a country’s aggregate placement on the crime
index. On Numbeo’s crime indices, values were generated using variables such as: level of
crime, crime vector (increasing, constant, or decreasing), respondents’ reported safety alone at
different times in the day, problems with drugs / property crimes / violent crimes / corruption,
and more (Numbeo, 2022). The combination of these variables aims to cover as many aspects of
crime as possible in order to maximize validity and scope while still remaining concise, yet these
crime index standings are not the primary concern for this study: the objects of fascination are
the reasons why some countries place where they place. As stated before, legal systems seek to
maintain order, and every government desires maximum social stability within their regions. If
this is the operating presumption, investigating the reasons for routine placements at the polar
regions on the crime index should provide some insight. What characteristics are shared between
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Venezuela, Papua New Guinea, and Afghanistan that are not shared by Japan, Switzerland, and
South Korea?
Surely, there are a lot of commonalities associated between these two groups of
countries, but some are not relevant to this study. Furthermore, some common characteristics
may be present in both groups. A prime example of both of these concepts is the strictness of gun
control. Japan, for instance, has some of the strictest gun laws in the world, with an estimated
377,000 civilian firearms as of 2017 (0.30 per 100 persons) (Small Arms Survey, 2018).
Conversely, Afghanistan’s data suggests around 4,270,000 civilian firearms (12.5 per 100
persons), which seems like a large number until accounting for the United States, a country with
around 393,347,000 civilian firearms (120.48 per 100 persons) (Small Arms Survey, 2018). Of
course, evaluating two countries’ crime based a single characteristic is clearly unthorough, but
the example of gun strictness is useful for another reason: it shows that policy decisions or the
number of necessary elements for a type of crime alone cannot holistically determine a country’s
placement on the crime index. To further illustrate this, Venezuela’s gun regulations are
categorized as “restrictive” since their passage of stricter gun regulations in 2012 and 2013
(Alpers et al, 2022). Still, they had a homicide rate of 56.33 per 100,000 people, placing third
overall on the 2020 list of all countries and territories; this is compared to the United States’
placing of 89th with a homicide rate 5.3 per 100,000 people (Pariona, 2020).
As has been proclaimed, however, this study is not based on guns. This study is not based
on policy decisions, nor is this study on the psychological processes that drive crime on a microlevel. Additionally, this study is not on cultural or geographical differences. Although all these
factors (and many more) certainly contribute to total crime levels or crime indices, they are not
the focus of this study either. The problems with variables like these is that they are difficult to
quantify due to their subjective nature. Also, other variables fluctuate to such a degree that it
would be irresponsible to track and incorporate them into any serious analysis. This begs the
question: what, then, is a viable variable to predict crime?
Economic conditions refer to the state of macroeconomic variables and trends in a given
country at a specific point in time (Chen, 2020). Macroeconomic variables over a given area are
tracked by governments and international organizations across the world, leading to measurable,
quantifiable, reliable information. Most importantly about macroeconomic indicators, however,
is that they are an output of sorts. No matter the inputs of cultural influences, government
structure, war status, general tolerance levels, particular pieces of legislation, alliances,
environments, or any other macro-variable that may contribute to crime, a macroeconomic
indicator is generated from the combination. These will be the variables of concern, as they
innately control for, theoretically, many omitted elements.
Still, a noteworthy limitation here is that macroeconomic variables, while derived from a
plethora of factors (some of which are listed above), can also play into them a bit. Similar to the
other options presented, they are not perfect for the sake of analysis alone due to their feedbackloop relationship with some of the other variables. Despite this, the macroeconomic variables of
economic conditions, due to their summative nature and succinct, reliable data, may very well be
the best tool for this analysis on crime. As far as specific macroeconomic variables, four of the
most important metrics include aggregate output or income, unemployment rate, inflation rate,
and interest rate (Sahu, 2022).
Now that economic conditions and crime are bound in this analysis, preexisting research
and analyses may offer additional information on the relationship between the two. Additionally,
these findings, along with supplementary information, may aid in crafting the research method
6

aimed at ascertaining the impact of economic conditions on crime. This examination will cover
the relationships between certain macroeconomic variables and crime within a particular country
over many time periods; it will also use a comparative approach and investigate this relationship
internationally among the same time period. There will be a review of macroeconomic variables
and other factors that influence crime in order to ascertain the magnitude of the relationship
between economic conditions and crime, even though solely macroeconomic variables will be
used in the manual analysis at the end of the survey.
II. Reasoning for the Variables
Before exploring the various studies and documentation surrounding economic
conditions and crime, it is necessary to understand the essences and present conditions of these
variables. In analyzing crime, there are numerous angles that could be selected. Criminologists
routinely group crimes into the following categories: violent crime, property crime, white-collar
crime, organized crime, and consensual/victimless crime (University of Minnesota, 2010?).
Although there is certainly diversity within these categories, the divisions they impose can be
analyzed separately (and even tested against each other). For example, perhaps white-collar
crimes are affected more by economic conditions than violent crime. Regardless, it is important
to consider that whichever method of crime assessment is utilized will include an array of
crimes. Numbeo’s crime index’s methodology is detailed above; any other measurement (such as
total crimes per 100 people) will also have some sort of unique methodology in counting crimes.
Is an issuance of a speeding ticket an example of a logged crime? Is it weighed the same as
armed robbery? These are questions that researchers must consider when aggregating and
displaying their data.
The primary reason that economic conditions are tracked in relation to crime is that these
conditions may relate to poverty in some way, and poverty is understood to be a reason why
people commit crime. In fact, poverty is sometimes considered the number one reason for crime
(NetNewsLedger, 2019). On this same list, however, sits unemployment, a macroeconomic
variable of interest in representing overall economic conditions, specifically in the realm of
labor. This is already known, but this contradicts the idea of poverty and unemployment being
the same. Still, there is a relationship. The Bureau of Labor Statistics cites that periods of
unemployment, along with involuntary part-time employment and low earnings, “hinder a
worker’s ability to earn income above the poverty threshold” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).
Poverty inflicts a sense of desperation within people. When people lack necessary resources to
live, or they lack anything above the survival threshold, they will sometimes commit crimes out
of necessity. If everyone had a stable, high earning job (relative to their area’s economy), there
would be no need for anyone to commit crimes out of financial necessity.
The issue of poverty remains a primary objective for governments, organizations, and
charities to remedy. Whether eradicating poverty is based solely on lowering the amount of
crime it induces or whether this mission is far more humanitarian in its core is irrelevant; other
than a select few who opt to renounce worldly possessions, there are little who would choose
poverty over wealth. The United Nations, which is comprised of over 193 Member States, has a
list of 17 Sustainable Development Goals to be accomplished by 2030 (United Nations, 2022).
The very first goal on this list is No Poverty, which aims to “end poverty in all its forms
everywhere” (United Nations, 2022). There were massive strides being made in this endeavor
until the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Decades of progress on this front have
7

disintegrated, and the United Nations projects, although estimates were that the world was not on
track to meet this goal by 2030 anyways, there will be an increase from the original projection of
6% of the world’s population living in extreme poverty by 2030 (United Nations, 2022).
International cooperation is definitely needed to eradicate poverty worldwide due to how
interconnected the world has become. Some international organizations, such as UNICEF, are
working hard to craft analyses of child poverty and to develop sound, tested policy
recommendations for world governments and international bodies (UNICEF, 2022).
III. The State of Economic Affairs
It is impossible to discuss contemporary economic conditions adequately and sufficiently
without discussing the pandemic. COVID-19 has been ravaging the world’s economies since late
2019 and early 2020. There have been brief moments of celebration, but much of the world and
its economies have fallen victim to its infectious nature. The New York Times aggregates
COVID-19 information (daily) from the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the US
Census Bureau, the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University,
and assorted world governments and health agencies to produce a leading hub with an
interactable interface capable of displaying an abundance of data. As of March 24th, 2022, there
have been approximately 476 million COVID-19 cases that have resulted in approximately 6.1
million deaths (New York Times, 2022). The relevance of these figures, in addition to each
individual loss of life, is seen in the opportunity cost brought about by COVID-19’s existence
and current cases. The disease transformed the landscape of just about every form of interaction
and commerce.
There is still discourse on whether or not the magnitude of the restrictions in place to
protect the public against COVID-19 match the gravity and danger of the disease, but most
sensible people would admit that the measures should be as adaptive and responsive as the virus
itself. Regardless of opinion, a significant number of deaths caused by COVID-19 (including all
immediate, subsequent deaths arising from COVID-19 complications) affected people who were
active, contributing members to the economy. The impact is even larger than this, however, as
those individuals often had families who were left without a source of income. These families,
for the most part, were left worse off as a consequence of the deaths; the same could be said
about the workplaces that employed these people. The situations only worsen in areas in the
world with limited social safety barriers in place. The problem expands further when the
calculations include those who did not die from COVID-19 but who could not work during their
time of infection. Of course, these individuals could not contribute to total productivity of the
workplace during this time, posing an opportunity cost on their companies. The employees,
depending on their negotiated (or determined) benefits and pay structure, may not have even
been compensated during their time away from their occupation, inching them (and their
families) closer to poverty. Throughout the pandemic, an overwhelming number of companies
across the globe were forced to cease operations (either temporarily or permanently) as a result
of restrictions imposed to counteract the deadliest disease in American history and one of the
deadliest in global history (Branswell, 2021).
US Vice President, Kamala Harris, said during an interview on MSNBC that, as of June
2021, one third of small businesses closed as a result of the pandemic and its associated
externalities (Harris, 2021). Independent fact checkers from Politifact.com ruled these remarks as
“mostly true,” noting, while the numbers agree with the results of a survey performed by the
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Small Business Roundtable and additional data from Harvard University, that it was impossible
to distinguish how many businesses had closed forever and how many were biding their time
until better conditions arose (Nichols, 2021). Based on these statistics, it is bleak to imagine the
true impact on small businesses after an additional year of COVID-19.
There is tremendous turmoil in each individual case of COVID-19 affecting business and
commerce, but it is the larger, cumulative macroeconomic variables that will aid in investigating
the relationship between economic conditions and crime. The pandemic, due to its vast influence
on a multitude of worldly affairs, has led to a discounting of modern statistics to a degree. In
many publications, surveys, and analyses, there are asterisks in the years 2020, 2021, and 2022.
These years, many feel, do not adequately represent a traditional year. Part of this is
indisputable: the aforementioned years were certainly not traditional. Despite this, how valid is it
to discount the data based on the existence of COVID-19? If the pandemic persists for many
more years to the point in which it becomes indistinguishable from baseline reality, does the old
data become unrepresentative? This issue is important in the academic community, yet the crux
of the answer resides in factors beyond the control of any singular party: the resolution of the
pandemic. Without an answer in sight, however, this analysis must operate while balancing this
intellectual dispute. While current, updated information is crucial in understanding modern
events and the latest academic studies, data for the regression analyses in this study will not
incorporate information past the year of 2019. Perhaps this is based on a subconscious, optimistic
outlook that the pandemic will soon cease, and the world will return to normalcy. In any case,
this may be considered a limitation in the accuracy of the findings since it does not account for
the externalities caused by the pandemic. The longer the clutches of COVID-19 persist, the more
this study may regret its decisions. This portion will be condensed and referenced in the
methodology and limitations sections.
Processing COVID-19’s impact on economic conditions will take a large quantity of time
and resources; knowing this, it will likely need a very long study of its own. Still, It would be
ridiculous and regrettable not to discuss the issues it brings about, especially as a powerful,
change-inducing mechanism of the macroeconomic variables that are the focus of this study.
This is, of course, factoring in that the original regressions produced by this study will not use
this data; post-2019 data is more pertinent than pre-2019 in many ways.
The Center on Budget and Policy Initiatives contains a research division tasked with
tracking economically related information to help form and justify policy decisions. Notably, this
organization primarily conducts internal analyses within the United States. There have been
allusions to COVID-19’s effects regarding unemployment, but this research indicates that
approximately 3 million less people are currently employed in early 2022 than before the
pandemic (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2022). Notably, the unemployment rate has
been recovering since the worst portion of the pandemic. The unemployment rate in April 2020
“jumped to a level not seen since the 1930s”, eventually landing at 4.9% by October 2021, a far
cry from the pre-pandemic recording of 3.5% in February 2020 (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2022). Additionally, global median GDP (a common measure of aggregate output, an
important macroeconomic variable) fell by 3.9% from 2019 to 2020, representing the worse
downturn since the Great Depression (Oum et al, 2022). Domestically, GDP in the United States
alone fell by 3.5% during this same period (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2021). Due to the
restrictions introduced as a result of pandemic, coupled with the tangible effects of the public
health emergency, companies simply lacked the ability to increase (or even sustain) their current
levels of production. While exact, accurate counts of GDP are not available for 2021 at the time
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of writing, the World Bank does project an increase in American GDP from 2020 to 2021 and
from 2021 to 2022 (World Bank, 2022). Still, considering the economic tensions stemming from
Russia’s invasion into Ukraine in Q1 2022, experts are predicting that a decrease in American
GDP growth forecasts by .2pp to 3.5% (Coulton, 2022). This comes as a result of the higher
energy prices induced by the sanctions against Russian energy and the United States hiking the
interest rate at a faster rate than was predicted (Coulton, 2022).
Governments across the world responded to COVID-19 in a myriad of ways. The United
States introduced stimulus checks in an effort to stimulate the economy and help people remain
afloat for the duration of the pandemic. As referenced earlier, many businesses had to either
restructure their business model, close temporarily, or close completely. Economists at the
Federal Reserve concluded that 800,000 US establishments had closed in 2020 alone, which is
approximately 200,000 more than historical levels (Simon, 2021). The service sector was hit
particularly hard, with barber shops, nail salons, and restaurants affected the most (Simon, 2021).
These closures led to the increased unemployment that has been mentioned already. The
enormity of this problem in the United States cannot be emphasized enough: from March 2020 to
October 2020 alone, there were 60 million unemployment claims filed (Cutler & Summers,
2020). For perspective, these filings often exceeded 1 million unique filings a week; the previous
largest number of filings (based on data from 1967 on) came in 1982 with 695,000 unique filings
in a week (Cutler & Summers, 2020). It must be noted that the unemployment rate does not
consider everyone who files as unemployed to be truly, in fact, unemployed (via legal definitions
and criteria), but these statistics show how desperate of a time 2020 was in terms of
unemployment.
The United States stimulus checks helped remedy some of the immediate economic
consequences of the pandemic, but they may have had another affect as well: inflation. The exact
cause of inflation, whenever it occurs at a level that falls too far outside of an agreed-upon upper
and lower bound, is often hotly contested; the inflation seen in early 2022 is no exception to this
pattern. Still, there seems to be somewhat of a consensus that the stimulus checks distributed by
the US government played a part in the increase in the consumer price index in conjunction with
the Russian war in Ukraine. Specifically, this index rose 7% from January 2021 to January 2022;
Robert Triest, who is a chair and professor of economics at Northeastern University, attributes a
portion of the increase to the above factors, adding that supply chain bottlenecks contributed as
well (Thomsen, 2022). Triest added that the associated fiscal and monetary policies were not a
government mistake; rather, these decisions were successful in preventing a full economic
collapse, despite some consequences (Thomsen, 2022). The precise level in which policies
should be instituted will always be clearer after the fact, but a bit of extra inflation beats a totally
desecrated economy. Arguments continue to be presented both in support of and against the
policy decisions enacted as a response to COVID-19, but the United States (as of March 2022)
has avoided hyperinflation and other apocalyptic economic consequences depicted in disaster
movies.
In the United States, there may be an even more structural factor that is contributing to
these inflation peaks. The factor in question has long been discussed in political and financial
circles yet it is just now coming to the forefront of the minds of the American public: the
increasing cartelization of corporate America and its profit maximization mechanisms. Before
supplying concrete examples of this phenomenon, it is best to break down the relevant parts to
their simplest, most essential forms via a hypothetical bird’s eye view on a single market. If there
are four major companies in a market segment for an entire region that supply a product or
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service with relatively uniform characteristics, there is little stopping the four firms from
collaborating (or not) and simultaneously raising their prices. It would be easy in the current era;
simply blame the supply chain, increasing labor costs, or increasing transportation costs. With
cooperation (or suspicious synchronization), these leading firms could increase prices past what
is necessary to cover the higher costs imposed on them. If there was a cost increase of Y to a
firm’s product currently priced at price X, one would expect the traditional economic assumption
of perfect competition to hold, forcing the new price for the product to become X + Y. This
would allow the firm to maintain current profit levels and simply pass the associated cost
increases back to the consumer. Depending on how competitive the market is, the firm may even
price lower than X +Y in order to maintain price advantage over competitors and draw in more
customers. Still, evidence claims the exact opposite of this occurred in the United States from
2020 through 2022.
Perhaps the most flagrant violators were the four largest meat processing companies in
the United States. After investigating the official earnings statements from Tyson Foods Inc, JBS
SA, Marfrig Global Foods SA, and Seaboard Corp RIC, National Economic Council Director
Brian Deese published his team’s findings on the White House website in December 2021
(Shalal, 2021). The analysis concludes that there was a 50% increase in gross profit margins and
at 300% increase in net profit margins (Deese et al, 2021). If the increased meat prices were
simply a result of increased input prices, the profit margins likely would have remained
relatively flat (Deese et al, 2021). This has occurred since the pandemic’s inception: the
aforementioned statements detail a 120% collective jump in gross profits and a 500% increase in
net income between these four companies since the COVID-19’s beginning (Shalal, 2021). More
shocking than these numbers, however, is that these increased meat prices accounted for 25% of
the rise in consumer prices for food consumed at home during November 2021, meaning that
these meat price increases were a “big driver in the surge of inflation” observed throughout 2021
(Shalal, 2021).
While some may claim this a cruel overreach by these companies in the pursuit of profit
maximization, others may argue that it is merely an unfortunate side effect of the American
version of capitalism. Whichever viewpoint one chooses to adopt is strictly their decision, but
what is clear is that the commerce in the United States may not be as competitive as it ought to
be. To be perfectly clear, this cartelization and collaboration has long been a concern with the
capitalistic economic system, and the meat processing industry is far from the only market
segment to be accused of fostering uncompetitive conditions. With the chaos emanating from the
pandemic, there exist opportunities for dominant companies with large market shares to increase
their prices past their increases in costs; whether these companies choose to collaborate with
other industry giants may be relevant too, but the end result will be inflation, especially if the
industry is as foundational as the meat processing industry. For example, the diamond industry
contained the De Beers cartel out of South Africa, a clearly uncompetitive entity whose
uncontested domination eventually dwindled with time (Dharmadhikari, 2008). The legitimacy
of dominant American telecom company practices has been widely questioned due to concerns
over conglomeration, cooperative price hiking, and transparency issues (Transparency
International, 2015). Despite the characteristics of a country’s economic system of choice, there
will be trade-offs of some kind; this concept is innately embedded within the fabric of
economics. What truly matters is having the ability to investigate the underlying causes of the
shifts in macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, to better understand how to safeguard
against catastrophe.
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The last major remaining macroeconomic variable to examine is the interest rate. The
Federal Reserve Board of Governors chair, Jerome Powell, oversaw a large purchasing of US
government and mortgage-backed securities and supportive lending to households, employers,
financial market participants, and state and local governments; Powell acknowledged that the
Federal Reserve would be maintaining these positions to an “unprecedented extent” until there
was confidence that the United States was “solidly on the road to recovery” from COVID-19’s
effects on the economy (Milstein & Wessel, 2021). The Federal Reserve offered “forward
guidance” on the interest rates, claiming that they would keep them “near zero” until the
economy regains normalcy (Milstein & Wessel, 2021). In March 2022, the Federal Reserve
increased interest rates for the first time in three years, simultaneously forecasting six more
increases throughout 2022 in order to combat inflation (Davison, 2022). This is because, by
February 2022, the employment situation has improved. The unemployment decreased to 3.8%
with job growth in leisure and hospitality, professional and business services, health care, and
construction (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2022). It is because of this metric that Powell and the
rest of the Fed personnel feel comfortable raising the interest rate. Powell is currently ready to
risk an increase in unemployment to remedy the ongoing situation with inflation; Powell
remarked that there remains a “high priority on the labor market”, but price stability is necessary
for a strong labor market (Davidson, 2022). The increase in interest rate may be indicative of the
American economy recovering from its sluggishness, but the overall objective is likely to reduce
any excess demand in the labor market, among other things.
IV: The State of Crime
Crime is the dependent variable of this analysis, but it may be trickiest to develop a
succinct, all-encompassing metric for. Among the available options, there is the crime index that
has already been mentioned, but this is largely used in international comparisons. There is also
specific separations of crime rates per X amount of people (usually per 100,000), but these
distinctions often come with their own problems, namely their over-specificity; of course, these
can sometimes be combined into the five aforementioned categories for the sake of productive
analysis. In addition to these concerns, a multitude of local, regional, and national sources collect
and publish time statistics. With so many parties submitting information, there are increased
odds for making mistakes. On this same tangent, different jurisdictions have different laws,
meaning they have different crimes. Sometimes the disparity is small, but sometimes this is not
the case, especially when comparing crimes across countries. For instance, the United States and
China have long been at odds on the subject of intellectual property law (Schulze, 2020). China
is often willing to (all but) copy exact products from America; these replications would be
considered illegal infringement (a crime) in the US (Schultze, 2020). This example illustrates
that problems arise in comparing crime across jurisdictions with different legal codes due to
certain actions being labeled legal or illegal depending on the place they occurred in.
Regardless of the issues within developing definitive criteria for crime, achieving a
current understanding of domestic and international crime is critical before selecting a method
for representing crime in regression. Through the issues here, there is still an abundance of recent
crime data available, and it is important to see where the United States and the rest of the world
sit in terms of crime before delving into crime’s relationship with economic conditions. The
present economic situation has been explored at length; layering it with crime information will
begin the primary portion of analysis for this piece, even if there will be certain exemptions in
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data past 2019. Inflection points in history with especially favorable or especially poor economic
conditions could prove valuable in evaluating the relationship between the variables, as well.
The current situation for crime in the United States is one that many predicted would
occur following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since restrictions have been easing and
since people have been returning to a somewhat pre-2019 lifestyle, the crime levels have since
changed. Because of the effects of the pandemic, including being the resulting economic
conditions, crime increased in 2020 and 2021 in the United States with violent crime increasing
at a more rapid rate than property crime (King, 2021). The FBI notes that 2020 featured a
highest-in-decades peak in homicides; more than this, the data collected shows that violent crime
increases were occurring in areas outside of major metropolitan centers, contrary to previous
crime waves (King, 2021). Still, while there was an uptick of violent crimes for 2020 and some
of 2021, there was an overall reduction in property crimes, mainly attributed to many businesses
being closed and more people staying at home (King, 2021). Still, as is the case for most crime,
the effects of crime were most apparent in low-income communities, perhaps due, at least in part,
to the economic conditions within those communities (King, 2021). Low-income communities
have often have higher rates of unemployment, lower salaries and wages, and few opportunities
for childcare and mental health resources, but many of these factors increased substantially in
early 2020, right when the crime wave began in the United States.
The previous article cited data from the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer, which aggregates
data from over 15,500 law enforcement sources across the United States. This tool is accessible
to anyone, and it is perhaps the best source of information because of its ability to accurately
display different kinds of crimes over any area in the country. The most overarching division is
between violent crimes and property crimes, which will serve this analysis well. Attached below
are the violent crime data and property crime data expressed in terms of rate per 100,000 people,
as published by the FBI.

(Figure 1. United States Rate of Violent Crime Offenses per 100,000 people, by year. Source:
FBI Crime Data Explorer)
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(Figure 2. United States Rate of Property Crime Offenses per 100,000 people, by year. Source:
FBI Crime Data Explorer)
From this information, and from additional records on the Crime Data Explorer, it is
observable that violent crime rates tend to fluctuate more than property crime rates, at least since
the FBI started tracking this data in 1985 (FBI, 2021). In fact, property crimes rates have
decreased in the United States since 2001, with the only variations being in the magnitude of the
decrease. Whether the cause of this is due to advancements in policing, technological
improvements in cameras and remote security, or other factors remains the subject of discourse
within political and law enforcement circles. Violent crimes, in contrast, experience both shifts in
magnitude and direction. Violent crimes, as far as for the purposes of the crimes catalogued by
the FBI in the Crime Data explorer, consist of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault;
property crimes consist of arson, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft (FBI, 2021).
The rape data shows the sharpest decline in rate of rape since the start of data collection in 1985,
and this comes even after a more accurate, inclusive, and generous definition for the crime was
developed in 2013. A representation of this data starting from 2010 is shown below.

(Figure 3. United States Rate of Rape Offenses per 100,000 people, by year. Source: FBI Crime
Data Explorer)
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While the significance of reduction is not as dramatic as seen in rape offenses, robberies
also saw a decrease in rate from 2019 to 2020. In both instances, the most compelling reason is
likely due to the tendency for more people to remain at home during the pandemic, lowering
opportunities for these crimes to even occur. Despite the reductions in rape and robbery offenses,
however, violent crime rates grew at a rate not seen for decades; the lower rates in rapes and
robberies were nullified by the sheer magnitude of homicides and aggravated assaults (FBI,
2021). The appropriate graphs are inserted below, starting from the start of FBI data collection
for maximum perspective.

(Figure 4. United States Rate of Homicide Offenses per 100,000 people, by year. Source: FBI
Crime Data Explorer)

(Figure 5. United States Rate of Aggravated Assault Offenses per 100,000 people, by year.
Source: FBI Crime Data Explorer)
While arson and motor vehicle theft rates increased from 2019 to 2020, there was a larger
decrease in burglary and larceny-theft rates, causing overall property crime rates to decrease as
we observed in figure 2 (FBI, 2021). Despite the accuracy of the data above, there is
unfortunately no complete, full-year data from the FBI past 2020, but there is no shortage of
articles detailing crime 2021 and 2022; in fact, there have already been quite a few.
The New York Times published that, at least before September 22, 2021, that homicides
were increasing at a slower rate then their historic increase in 2020 (Asher, 2021). There is
additional information in this article that addresses the unprecedented nature of a portion of the
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data above. Even considering available information before 1985 that is inaccessible through the
FBI’s Crime Data Explorer, the 29% increase in homicide rates in 2020 was the largest in United
States history, destroying the previous largest increase of 12.7% in 1968 (Asher, 2021). Another
interesting takeaway was that the overall 5% increase in violent crime was overshadowed by
decreases in other crime areas, as there was about a 4% to 5% decrease in major crimes in 2020
(Asher, 2021).
New York City, America’s most populated city by a wide margin, has long been a
harbinger for other American cities. Being at the forefront of commerce and culture as well, New
York City often experiences things before other areas of the United States. Of course, due to the
population and population density, some phenomena will be more serious in New York City;
other phenomena will only occur in New York City, but this is rarer. NYC officials reported that
major crimes spiked 60% in February 2022 compared to February 2021 (Tucker & Morales,
2022). A professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and former crime analyst supervisor
with the NYPD claimed that the increase in hate crimes and subway crimes is “just an increase
of more people being outside”, which further corroborates the theory revolving around crime
rates fluctuating as a function of the number of victims readily available (Tucker & Morales,
2022). A higher slope in the decreased property crime rates than in previous years from 2019 to
2020 was hypothesized to have occurred due to a lesser availability of people wandering about;
this was especially evident in the rate of rape offenses as shown in figure 3. NYPD data shows
that sexual assault offenses (which includes rape) surged 322% from 9 offenses for a given week
(March 29th-April 4th) in 2020 to 38 during the same week in 2021; experts again blamed the
rising rates on more people journeying out of their homes (Balsamini, 2021). With even lesser
restrictions in 2022, it will be interesting to see what the crime data reveals when it is published
by national and international organizations. As for now, the world is only able to predict and
project.
The previous information details how the United States has been faring in terms of crime
over the last few years with special attention directed at the most recent results, but what about
the rest of the world? After this next stage, we will be ready to investigate the link between
economic conditions and the crime. The FBI is an excellent source of information for the United
States due to its authority and its status as a national agency, not a regional one. In the
international environment, the United Nations functions like a national agency functions within a
country in that it collects data from its regions (countries). Specifically, the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is in charge of compiling and presenting this information.
Among other categories, the UNODC aggregates information by violent crime, intentional
homicide, sexual crime, property crime, and financial crime. There are some differences in fields
compared to the FBI’s, such as homicide and sexual-related offenses being separated from
violent crime, but the subcategories within each field matches up decently with the data obtained
from the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer (UNODC, 2022). Despite its abundance of information, the
UNODC themselves do not combine the different crime offenses into a single rate. Rather, the
overarching category, such as violent or property crime, is simply a label above the other crimes
that are tracked. Direct data comparisons are cumbersome without an aggregation into a rate.
Additionally, there are numerous gaps in the data collection with an emphasis on recent data,
which was the primary piece of interest while investigating current and recent domestic crime
rates.
While not a one-to-one comparison, returning to Numbeo’s crime indices will suffice as
an overview for current international crime. The methodology for determining a country’s crime
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index was described in the introduction section of this analysis, but the larger the crime index,
the worse off a country is in terms of crime. This measurement factors in property crimes and
violent crimes as well as other metrics. It must be noted that recent data must be taken with a
grain of salt, as even the UNODC has had trouble obtaining official data submitted by its
Member States. Still, Numbeo’s Crime Index condenses a respectable amount of information
into a single statistic and has data on a most countries. Since a lengthy review was performed on
the semi-current state of crime in the United States, it only makes sense to view its crime index
first as a reference point. In 2019, the United States ranked 45th out of 118 possible countries
with a crime index of 47.13 (Numbeo, 2022). In 2020, this score increased to a 47.20, but the
United States moved to 50th of 129 entries (Numbeo, 2022). 2021 saw the United States crime
index increase to 47.74, but his was accompanied by the United States descending to 56th out of
135 entries (Numbeo, 2022). The limited data from 2022 (up until March 2022) has the United
States crime index increasing again to 48.16; the United States moved down to 57th out of 142
entries. The differences in relative movement and index scores suggest that the world, as a
whole, may be experiencing an aggregate uptick in crime in recent years.
The indices themselves are more important than the exact positioning of a country in the
standings due to differing amounts of entries by year. Relative positioning, however, could be
useful, especially as analysis begins on tying economic conditions and crime. As a precursor to
the next section, which will consider prior research and discussion linking the aforementioned
variables, and the regression analysis, which will feature linear regression to generate a
predictive equation to predict crime levels based on the inputs of economic conditions, the
remaining bit of this section will compare the crime indices of the United States and five other
countries based solely on GDP per capita. Notably, there will be no international data in the
regression, but perspective is invaluable in understanding the United States’ exact position.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a part of the United Nations system of
organizations but retains its independence as an agency, nonetheless. A report was published on
October 26th, 2021 that projects GDP for all countries barring Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Lebanon for the 2021 year using recent data (IMF, 2021). An excerpt from the data compiled
from the IMF is attached below; random countries with different GDP (in USD) were selected to
evaluate their crime indices.
Country
United States
Japan
Argentina
Morocco
Costa Rica
Papua New Guinea
Mongolia

Subject Descriptor
GDP (USD), current prices
GDP (USD), current prices
GDP (USD), current prices
GDP (USD), current prices
GDP (USD), current prices
GDP (USD), current prices
GDP (USD), current prices

Scale
Billions
Billions
Billions
Billions
Billions
Billions
Billions

2020
2021
Estimates Start After Estimates Start After
20,893.75 22,939.58
2020
2020
5,045.10 5,103.11
2020
2020
389.064 455.172
2020
2020
114.602 126.035
2020
2020
61.833
61.46
2020
2020
23.279
26.461
2019
2019
13.137
14.28
2020
2020

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021

(Figure 6. Selected Countries’ GDP Projections for 2020 and 2021. Source: International
Monetary Fund October 2021 Report)
It is only customary to begin with the United States. Even if China were considered, the
United States still remains in the top position when ranked by projected GDP in USD (IMF,
2021). Its Numbeo crime index for 2021 is 47.74 (Numbeo, 2022). In the order of projected 2021
GDP in USD, Japan’s crime index is 21.95, Argentina’s crime index is 63.31, Morocco’s crime
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index is 49.10, Costa Rica’s crime index is 55.34, Papua New Guinea’s crime index is 80.24, and
Mongolia’s crime index is 55.64 (Numbeo, 2022). Of course, GDP is only one of the four
macroeconomic variables of interest representing overall economic conditions, so any pattern
drawn from this is incomplete. Still, the point of this section is to generate an image of how
crime has fared internationally in recent years; the GDP was merely used to put a few randomly
selected countries in order. Papua New Guinea happens to be the country with the second highest
crime index in 2021, and Japan is the 9th lowest crime index, potentially skewing some of the
data (Numbeo, 2022). Notably, a G7 country (countries known to dominate the world economy
with the notable exclusion of China) is not observed until the 47th entry; France had a crime
index of 49.20 in 2021 (Numbeo, 2022). This is hard to outright dismiss, but true numerical
analysis is required to dismiss any calls of coincidence. It would likely not be unreasonable to
predict lower crime indices, on average, for a more advanced economy. Let’s investigate
discourse surrounding this relationship.
V: Economy Meets Crime
If there was ever a landmark negative economic focal point in American history, the
Great Depression makes a strong case for one. What is curious about this, however, is that
documentation from that time period suggest that there was not a rise in crime during this period
(Newton, 2018). There is additional contradictory information from periods of supposed
prosperity where crime rates climb or remain even, such as the 1960s or the 1980s and 1990s, yet
both violent crime rates and property crime rates fell during the Great Recession in 2008 and
2009 (Newton, 2018). This article concludes that “crime is not affected by the economy” based
on the philosophy of the above information applied to a few more circumstances (Newton,
2018). While this may certainly be the case, there was no quantitative analysis of American
crime data and economic data, and its description of “good” economic conditions is undoubtedly
vague; undefined terminology can be harmful to meaningful discussion. What about a period
where there is a high unemployment rate but GDP or GDP per capita increased drastically from
the last period? There is nuance here.
Another article references similar information sources and acknowledges the same
conclusion, but it considers another factor: the further division of crime into multiple categories.
Namely, the Great Depression’s crime increase was largely due to violent crime surging, and this
was not stopped until President Roosevelt’s facilitation of an anti-crime package and the New
Deal (Razumich, 2020). Furthermore, the Great Recession was plagued by increases in robberies,
burglaries, and motor vehicle theft, raising the notion that perhaps economically motivated
crimes would increase in periods of hard economic conditions (Razumich, 2020). Lastly, there is
research suggesting that “consumer perception of the state of economy” highly correlates with
rising crime rates, isolating perceptions from the reality of the general economy (Razumich,
2020).
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) presented a microanalysis of the causes
of the different viewpoints on the relationship between economic conditions and crime, but
ultimately determined that both of the positions depend on the “questionable” assumption that
crime is “a rational act based on opportunity and risk on the part of the offender” (Schneider et
al, 2012). A subsequent prediction of economic conditions’ explanatory power on crime is
labelled as “limited” to mirror the ”limited rational decision making” possessed by criminals
(Schneider et al, 2012). The Department of Justice echoes the viewpoints considered by
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Razumich and many others, claiming that perhaps certain types of criminal activity are
dependent on economic conditions whereas other types are not (Schneider et al, 2012).
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) labels peaks in the unemployment
rate, a macroeconomic variable for economic conditions in this study, as recessions.
Additionally, they are the most trusted source as to what is considered a recession in the United
States economy. Attached below is a graph obtained from their website (using the Bureau of
Labor Statistics as a source for the exact numbers) cataloging recession periods after 1948
(NBER, 2022).

(Figure 7. Business Cycle Dating in the United States. Unemployment Rate, by year. Recessions
in Grey. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics via the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
Research published by the institute of World Economic Forum (WEC) in 2015 articulates
that recessions carry high youth unemployment rates that translate into student graduates
becoming criminals at higher rates during a recession than student graduates becoming criminals
during times with lower unemployment rates (Bell, 2015). There is quite a bit of additional
information detailing the ceilings that the former group encounter after they commit their first
crimes, but what is more pertinent to the central theme of this analysis is the following: when
examining data from the United States and the United Kingdom, the average arrest rate for a
recent graduate entering the labor market during a recession is 10.2% higher than the average
arrest rate for a recent graduate entering the labor market with a lower unemployment rate (Bell,
2015). Of course, arrest rates are not the same as convictions, but this data still claims statistical
significance with the respective 4% higher conviction rates (Bell, 2015). Additionally, the
WEC’s focus on this population suggests there could be populations that respond to a particular
variable (or a combination of them) at a higher rate than other populations. Lastly, this report
highlights that effects of a recession can be felt for many, many years past the recession itself.
For the recent graduates detailed above, the arrest rates and conviction rates were for life, also
showing that the full effects of a variable do not always manifest themselves immediately.
Residual effects can last through a lifetime, and this is important to remember regardless of the
regression results. Perhaps there are related phenomena visible with the other macroeconomic
19

variables that mirror the WEC’s findings of an “initially strong and long-lasting detrimental
effect of entering the labor market during a recession for individuals at the threshold of criminal
activity” but on the entire population rather than people entering the labor market. (Bell, 2015).
VI: Regression Analysis
i) Methods, Data Selection, and Limitations
For the regression analysis, the data representing crime (the dependent variable) was
compiled from Disaster Center, and it includes information on the United States dating back to
1960 on population, total crime rate per 100,000, violent crime rate per 100,000, and property
crime rate per 100,000 (Disaster Center, 2019). Further, there is additional breakdowns of violent
crime and property crime rates through (in rate per 100,000) murder, forcible rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and vehicle theft (Disaster Center, 2019). For the four
macroeconomic variables, GDP per capita change (annual %), average unemployment rate for
age 16 and over (annual %), average inflation rate of consumer prices (annual %), and real
interest rate change (annual %) were selected to quantitatively represent economic conditions;
the World Bank supplied the data for all economic variables except for unemployment, which
uses the Bureau of Labor Statistics as a source.
Due to some of the variables predicating on change, 1960 would be occupied with zerovalues. With this in consideration, the data will run from 1961 to 2019; this is more than enough
data points to assume a normal distribution under the Central Limit Theorem.
A per capita change approach was adopted for GDP due to this measurement being more
catered toward individuals, as it is individuals that commit crimes. Additionally, changes were
favored over flat readings of a variable; the findings may be more applicable to other countries
this way, although that will be a journey for a subsequent analysis.
Earlier, there was a reference to the idea that data beginning after the COVID-19
pandemic would not be used, and this remains true. The textual analysis sections explored the
current situation of crime and economic conditions quite well, so a three-year exemption in the
data is passable. Additionally, even if there was a desire to include the data, a lot of information
is missing in these years; many of the cells would feature projections rather than measurements.
It is still true, however, that the longer the duration of the pandemic, the less merit these findings
may hold. Macroeconomic variables may also be influenced by crime, creating a feedback loop
of sorts that muddies data.
Lastly, it must be noted that this study is examining the effects of four macroeconomic
variables. Although these four do stand out in political and economic literature alike, the
inclusion of many more economic variables may yield a more holistic picture on crime. Of
course, this is something for a subsequent analysis, but it is necessary to mention.
ii) Equations and Explanations
The implicit function for this regression captures all portions of economic conditions and
crime, and its two implicit forms are listed below:
Crime Rate = f(Economic Conditions)
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Crime Rate = f(GDP per capita change, average unemployment rate for ages 16 and over,
average inflation rate of consumer prices, real interest rate change)
For the purposes of regression modeling, the following function will represent the output
of the analysis:
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋G + 𝛽2𝑋U + 𝛽3𝑋P + 𝛽4𝑋I + ε
In this last equation, 𝑌 represents crime rate; 𝛽0 represents the intercept of the
regression; 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4 represent the calculated coefficients from the regression; 𝑋G, 𝑋U,
𝑋P, and 𝑋I represent GDP per capita change, average unemployment rate for ages 16 and over,
average inflation rate of consumer prices, and real interest rate change, respectively; ε represents
the error term of the regression.
In total, there will be three initial regression summaries. Each equation will look the
same, except that 𝑌 (the crime rate) will differ between total crime rate per 100,000, violent
crime rate per 100,000, and property crime rate per 100,000. For the data collected by the
Disaster Center, total crime is equivalent to the sum of violent crime and property crime, leaving
no other categories. In the results section, these three regressions will be compared, but it appears
as if the sheer magnitude of property crime in relation to violent crime will translate into very
similar results for property crime and total crime. All of the other parts of the equation above will
retain their same assignment for every regression.
Lastly, for the alpha level, .05 should suffice, as this is the generally accepted value to use in
related disciplines.
iii) Results
The summary outputs of the original regression equations are listed below in the order in
which they were described above:
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.7806975
0.609488587
0.580561816
765.7072548
59

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

4
54
58

Intercept
GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)
Average Unemployment Rate for Age 16 and over (Annual %)
Average Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (Annual %)
Real Interest Rate Changes (Annual %)

SS
49414127.4
31660610.4
81074737.8

MS
F
Significance F
12353531.85 21.07005239
1.6446E-10
586307.6

Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95% Lower 95.0%
1449.472043
441.3732306 3.284005332 0.001799708 564.5719945 2334.372091 564.5719945
-53.01674584
52.88754917 -1.002442856 0.320600732 -159.0498978 53.01640609 -159.0498978
186.700132
65.0030258 2.872176021 0.005814249 56.37691191 317.0233521 56.37691191
225.0050369
37.05825808 6.07165713 1.30865E-07 150.7077028 299.302371 150.7077028
236.1230026
45.00979816 5.24603558 2.66563E-06 145.8837905 326.3622147 145.8837905

TOTAL CRIME

(Figure 8. Regression Analysis Output: Total Crime)
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Upper 95.0%
2334.372091
53.01640609
317.0233521
299.302371
326.3622147

SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.663991852
0.440885179
0.399469267
117.8267781
59

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

4
54
58

Intercept
GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)
Average Unemployment Rate for Age 16 and over (Annual %)
Average Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (Annual %)
Real Interest Rate Changes (Annual %)

SS
591161.6599
749690.0801
1340851.74

MS
147790.415
13883.14963

F
Significance F
10.6453088 1.96448E-06

Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
200.6979347
67.91836615 2.954987673 0.00462576 64.52980913 336.8660603 64.52980913 336.8660603
-16.87447729
8.138318502 -2.073459927 0.04291397 -33.19082349 -0.558131082 -33.19082349 -0.558131082
21.14552583
10.00264402 2.113993638 0.03914998 1.091431996 41.19961965 1.091431996 41.19961965
11.16203558
5.702512447 1.957389077 0.055478717 -0.270813518 22.59488467 -0.270813518 22.59488467
36.04853438
6.926092794 5.204743201 3.09106E-06 22.16255439 49.93451437 22.16255439 49.93451437

VIOLENT CRIME

(Figure 9: Regression Analysis Output: Violent Crime)

SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.793485803
0.62961972
0.602184144
661.779644
59

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

4
54
58

Intercept
GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)
Average Unemployment Rate for Age 16 and over (Annual %)
Average Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (Annual %)
Real Interest Rate Changes (Annual %)

SS
MS
F
Significance F
40202312.44 10050578.11 22.94902475 4.06217E-11
23649424.05 437952.2973
63851736.5

Coefficients Standard Error
1248.167556
381.4666997
-36.22866454
45.70924886
165.7298179
56.18032089
213.7003195
32.02842952
200.2583956
38.90072612

t Stat
3.272022319
-0.792589365
2.949962108
6.672207244
5.147934643

P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
0.001864438 483.3728701 2012.962241 483.3728701 2012.962241
0.431485558 -127.8701909 55.41286178 -127.8701909 55.41286178
0.004690898 53.09505611 278.3645796 53.09505611 278.3645796
1.40259E-08 149.4871845 277.9134545 149.4871845 277.9134545
3.7875E-06 122.2671355 278.2496557 122.2671355 278.2496557

PROPERTY CRIME

(Figure 10: Regression Analysis Output: Property Crime)
Even before intensely examining these summaries, it is important to note that, for all of
the models, the Significance F approaches zero, meaning that there is the probability that all of
the coefficients in these equations are zero also is approaching zero. In other words, all three
regression models are significant enough to be interpreted (valid); they do not need to be thrown
out on the basis of an inadequate Significance F (say, higher than the chosen alpha level of .05).
Additionally, checking the signs of the variables is recommended before analyzing the
data. Of the variables mentioned, one would intuitively expect a negative relationship between
GDP per capita growth rate and crime rates. GDP growth would indicate some measure of
overall economic prosperity; it is not an innately “negative” tracker such as unemployment rate
and inflation rate. The summary outputs all include a negative sign on the coefficient for GDP
per capita growth, which is undoubtedly a good sign. The other coefficients (including the
intercept coefficient) all bear positive signs, indicating positive relationships.
Despite these positive signs, GDP per capita growth has a P-value above the designated
alpha level of .05, which means that all the regressions (since all of them contain this issue) must
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be reran without this variable. The previous data summaries will be preserved for posterity, but
the primary analyses will stem from the following summary outputs without GDP per capita
growth included. This will change the original function to the following and the summary
outputs to the following:
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋U + 𝛽2𝑋P + 𝛽3𝑋I + ε
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.776029329
0.602221519
0.580524511
765.7413049
59

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

3
55
58

Intercept
Average Unemployment Rate for Age 16 and over (Annual %)
Average Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (Annual %)
Real Interest Rate Changes (Annual %)

SS
MS
F
Significance F
48824951.77 16274983.92 27.75597069 4.60189E-11
32249786.03 586359.746
81074737.8

Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
1394.252858
437.9418565 3.183648324 0.002394355
175.1099475
63.9693584 2.73740353 0.008325349
233.0854389
36.1725835 6.443704494 3.06346E-08
233.0359479
44.90632196 5.189379528 3.14289E-06

Lower 95%
516.5977647
46.91248851
160.5939616
143.0416676

Upper 95%
2271.90795
303.3074065
305.5769161
323.0302281

Lower 95.0%
516.5977647
46.91248851
160.5939616
143.0416676

Upper 95.0%
2271.90795
303.3074065
305.5769161
323.0302281

P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95% Lower 95.0%
0.010782963 44.08369002 322.1612144 44.08369002
0.090587651 -2.852600592 37.76566998 -2.852600592
0.019972494 2.249759873 25.21806565 2.249759873
7.96856E-06 20.80900895 49.32292844 20.80900895

Upper 95.0%
322.1612144
37.76566998
25.21806565
49.32292844

TOTAL CRIME

(Figure 11: Fixed Regression Analysis Output: Total Crime)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.629580005
0.396370983
0.363445764
121.309298
59

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

3
55
58

Intercept
Average Unemployment Rate for Age 16 and over (Annual %)
Average Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (Annual %)
Real Interest Rate Changes (Annual %)

SS
MS
F
Significance F
531474.7223 177158.2408 12.03852226
3.6256E-06
809377.0177 14715.94578
1340851.74

Coefficients Standard Error
183.1224522
69.37906944
17.45653469
10.13407258
13.73391276
5.730487154
35.0659687
7.114092393

t Stat
2.639448088
1.722558681
2.396639656
4.929085365

VIOLENT CRIME

(Figure 12: Fixed Regression Analysis Output: Violent Crime)
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SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.79076607
0.625310977
0.604873394
659.5390231
59

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

3
55
58

Intercept
Average Unemployment Rate for Age 16 and over (Annual %)
Average Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (Annual %)
Real Interest Rate Changes (Annual %)

SS
MS
F
Significance F
39927191.73 13309063.91 30.59613139 9.04627E-12
23924544.77 434991.723
63851736.5

Coefficients Standard Error
1210.433868
377.2027738
157.8097371
55.09731274
219.222012
31.15573136
198.1488759
38.67816915

t Stat
P-value
3.208973931 0.002223838
2.864200254 0.00590787
7.036330153 3.28895E-09
5.123015909 3.9896E-06

Lower 95%
454.5026165
47.39225497
156.7845311
120.6360928

Upper 95%
1966.365119
268.2272193
281.6594929
275.661659

Lower 95.0%
454.5026165
47.39225497
156.7845311
120.6360928

Upper 95.0%
1966.365119
268.2272193
281.6594929
275.661659

PROPERTY CRIME

(Figure 13: Fixed Regression Analysis Output: Property Crime)
With the fixed regressions, the Significant F values are all below the alpha level of .05,
but the P-value for the unemployment rate is above .05 on the violent crime rate regression. This
variable was thrown out and the regression was redone. The resulting summary output is below.
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.603163041
0.363805654
0.341084427
123.4216275
59

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

2
56
58

Intercept
Average Inflation Rate, Consumer Prices (Annual %)
Real Interest Rate Changes (Annual %)

SS
MS
F
Significance F
487809.4442 243904.7221 16.01170833 3.16603E-06
853042.2958 15232.89814
1340851.74

Coefficients Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
284.644673
37.24203755 7.643101498 2.99571E-10
13.79528325
5.830158063 2.366193694 0.021456941
35.88626059
7.221734433 4.969202471 6.68783E-06

Lower 95%
210.0399069
2.116073217
21.41938811

Upper 95%
359.2494391
25.47449328
50.35313307

Lower 95.0%
210.0399069
2.116073217
21.41938811

Upper 95.0%
359.2494391
25.47449328
50.35313307

Violent Crime

(Figure 14: Final Regression Analysis Output: Violent Crime)
VII: Discussion and Conclusion
The R Square values for total crime and property crime are around 0.61, meaning that
approximately 61% of the variance in total crime rates or property crime rates can be explained
by the three remaining macroeconomic variables (average unemployment rate for age 16 and
over, average inflation rate for consumer prices, and real interest rate change). For violent crime
rates, approximately 36% of the variance can be attributed to the average inflation rate and the
real interest rate.
This disparity is consistent with hypotheses and studies cited earlier in the analysis, and
the difference in R-squares seems to also follow intuition. A downturn in economic conditions
likely constrict certain people into committing property crimes to achieve a certain standard of
living, or perhaps these individuals perceive unfairness in the economy and lash out by claiming
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what they rationalize they are entitled to. Notably, the especially violent year of 2020 (and 2021,
to a lesser but still significant extent) was not included in this data, but it is more likely that this
single data point would have served as an outlier, merely increasing Standard Error.
Of the four variables chosen to depict overall economic conditions, only GDP per capita
growth was statistically insignificant for every crime rate. The unemployment rate metric was
statistically insignificant only for violent crime. From 1961 until 2019, in the United States,
around 60% of the variance in total crime rates and 63% of the variance in property crime rates
can be explained through the average unemployment rate for age 16 and older, the average
inflation rate based on consumer prices, and the change in real interest rates; 36% of the variance
in violent crime rates can be explained through the average inflation rate based on consumer
prices and the change in real interest rates.
Perhaps with more variables or a different selection in variables, these coefficients of
determination could be even greater. Studies comparing international crime rates and
macroeconomic variables could offer greater insight on the universality (or lack thereof) of the
findings from this analysis. Crime rates for specific offenses could also be tested, as well as
consolidating total economic conditions into an index-like number and including it as an
independent variable alongside other metrics, such as population, firearms per person, or wealth
inequality. As years progress, studies utilizing data from the COVID-19 pandemic could provide
an answer to whether or not the criminal landscape was truly uprooted during this time. Followup studies should make use of bias testing as well, especially in the case where a variable must
be omitted due to an inadequate P-value.
Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn from this analysis oppose viewpoints stating that
economic conditions (at least for those which served as independent variables in the regression)
have zero effect on crime rates. Furthermore, property crime rates are generally more responsive
to economic conditions than violent crime rates.
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